Abstract. This paper introduces a new obfuscation called obfuscation of encrypted blind signature. Informally, Alice is Signer and Bob is User. Bob needs Alice to sign a message, but he does not want Alice to know what the message is. Furthermore, Bob doesn't want anyone to know the interactive process. So we present a secure obfuscator for encrypted blind signature which makes the process of encrypted blind signature unintelligible for any third party, while still keeps the original encrypted blind signature functionality. We use schnorr's blind signature scheme and linear encryption scheme as blocks to construct a new obfuscator. Moreover, we propose two new security definition: blindness w.r.t encrypted blind signature (EBS) obfuscator and one-more unforgeability(OMU) w.r.t EBS obfuscator, and prove them under Decision Liner Diffie-Hellman(DL) assumption and the hardness of discrete logarithm, respectively. We also demonstrate that our obfuscator satisfies the Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Property(ACVBP) property w.r.t dependent oracle, it is indistinguishable secure. Our paper expands a new direction for the application of obfuscation.
Introduction
Obfuscation in cryptography has been formally proposed by Barak, Goldreich et al. [1] at the first time. Although it is a theoretical hotspot, there hasn't been much progress in recent years. The implementation of obfuscation mainly depends on how to construct a secure obfuscator. Informally, obfuscator is an algorithm program which can transform a program into a new unintelligible program while its functionality holds. Barak et al. suggested that an obfuscator should satisfy the following three properties:
1. Functionality: the obfuscated program has the same functionality as the original program. 2. Polynomial Slowdown: the description length and running time of the obfuscated program are at most polynomially larger than the original program's.
1. Unforgeability: Adversary can not produce a legal blind signature on message after interacting with signer. 2. Blindness: The signatures of two given messages are computationally indistinguishable even under a set of known message-signature pairs.
Afterwards, on the basis of Schnorr's signature scheme, Okamoto [14] put forward a blind signature scheme named Schnorr's blind signature whose security was based on discrete logarithm problem. Schnorr [15] then proved its security.
In this paper, we firstly use Schnorr's blind signature scheme and linear encryption scheme [16] as blocks to construct a secure obfuscator for blind signature, which is complete and verifiable. In order to prove the security of the obfuscator, we propose two new security definitions, Blindness w.r.t encrypted blind signature(EBS) obfuscator and one-more unforgeability (EBS) obfuscator, to prove Theorem 5. The main method is constructing different adversaries to break the hardness assumption under security definition of ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle, the scheme is insecure if any adversary succeeds. The specific progress refers to section 5. We also prove that the OMU w.r.t EBS functionality implies OMU w.r.t EBS obfuscator under the assumption that EBS obfuscator satisfies ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle set. Obviously, we have OMU w.r.t EBS obfuscator. At last, we present the security proof of EBS obfuscator. i.e., the EBS obfuscator satisfies ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle. Thus, we illustrate that under the ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle, generating a blind signature on a message and then encrypting the signature are functionally equivalent to encrypt the sign key and then generate a blind signature on the message.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives preliminaries which contain three parts; Section 3 proposes new security definitions with respect to the basis of theorem's proof; Then section 4 constructs the secure obfuscator for special EBS functionality and section 5 gives the proof .
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the basic security definition and the hardness assumption that our proofs rely on.
Bilinear Maps
Set BMsetup be an initialization algorithm: on input security parameter 1 k , outputs the bilinear map parameters as pq, g, G, G T , eq, where G, G T are groups of prime order q P Θp2 k q, g is a generator of G and e is an efficient bilinear mapping from GˆG to G T . The mapping e satisfies the following two property:
Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1. (DL Assumption) For every PPT machine D, every polynomial pp¨q, all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u
The Definition of General Security
In this subsection we review the security definition of public-key encryption(PKE) scheme and digital blind signature(DBS) scheme. S etup is an algorithm that generates a parameter, on security parameter 1 n , which is used commonly by multiple users in a pair of PKE and DBS schemes.
A probabilistic public key cryptosystem PKE is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine Π that (1)EKG: on inputs p generates a pair of pubic-secret key ppk, skq and outputs the description of two algorithms, E and D such that (2)E is a probabilistic encryption algorithm: for some constants p , public key pk and a plaintext m, returns the ciphertext c, let MS pp, pkq be the message space defined by pp, pkq.
(3)D is a deterministic decryption algorithm: for some constants p, secret key sk and ciphertext c, returns the plaintext m.
Definition 2. (Indistinguishability of Encryptions against CPAs)
A PKE scheme pEKG, E, Dq satisfies the indistinguishability if the following condition holds: For every PPT machine pair pA 1 , A 2 q(adversary), every polynomial pp¨q, all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u polypnq ,
where we assume that A 1 produces a valid message pair m 1 and m 2 P MS pp, pkq and a hints h.
A digital blind signature DBS also contains three algorithms: (1)S KG: generates a pair of pubic-secret key ppk, skq on input p. (2)pS , Uq is a probabilistic interactive signing algorithm: for some constants p , secret key sk and l-bit plaintext m " m 1 m 2¨¨¨ml P MS pp, pkq, the execution of algorithm S pskq (by signer), and algorithm Uppk, mq (by user) for message m generates the signature σ, where MS pp, pkq is the message space defined by pp, pkq.
(3)V is a deterministic verification algorithm: for some constants p, public key pk, message m and signature σ, if σ is the valid signature of m, it accepts; Otherwise returns K.
The security of a blind signature scheme includes one-more unforgeability and blindness.
Definition 3. (Blindness) A blind signature scheme DBS " pS KG, pS , Uq, Vq is called blind if for any efficient algorithm A 3 , all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u polypnq , there exists
pp, pk, zq; b˚Ð A 3 pσ 0 , σ 1 q; b " b˚. Note that we use X ă¨,Ypy 0 qą 1 ,ă¨,Ypy 1 qą 1 to define the process that X invokes arbitrarily ordered executions with Ypy 0 q and Ypy 1 q, but interacts with each algorithm only once.
Definition 4. (One-more Unforgeability) A DBS scheme pS KG, pS , Uq, Vq is unforgetable if for any efficient algorithm A 4 (the malicious user), every polynomial pp¨q, all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u polypnq , there exist
pp, pk, zq; i f mi ‰ mj f or i ‰ j; Vpp, pk, mi , σi q " Accept f or all i; then return 1. Note that we use X !Y" k to define the process that X samples access to Y for at most k times.
Construct the Secure Obfuscator for Special EBS Functionality
This section presents a secure obfuscator for the blind signature and proves the security based on the generalized ACVBP definition.
Schnorr's Blind Signature
We use Schnorr's blind signature scheme [14] as a block to build the EBS functionality. The specific process is as follows:
2. Selects g 1 P G and x P Z q randomly. 3. Outputs the secret key sk " g S ign(p, sk, m) 
Linear Encryption Scheme
Boneh's linear encryption scheme [16] is another block to build the EBS functionality. The detail is as follows:
1. Parses p " pq, G, G T , e, gq. 2. Selects a P Z q and b P Z q randomly. 3. Outputs the secret key sk e " pa, bq and public key pk e " pg a , g b q.
Enc(p, pk e , m)
Veri f y(p, sk e , c)
1. Parses p " pq, G, G T , e, gq, sk e " pa, bq, and c " pc 1 , c 2 , c 3 q. [16] Under DL assumption, the linear encryption scheme satisfies the indistinguishability.
The Obfuscator for the EBS Functionality
EBS functionality consists of the blind signature scheme and encryption scheme above. We construct a circuit C p,sk,pk e which contains a common parameter p, the signing secret key sk and the public encryption key pk e . Note that the important point of obfuscation is how to rerandomize the Enc to make the two results scalar homomorphic. Here, we use the ReRand algorithm, given a cipertext pc 1 , c 2 , c 3 q and public key pk e " pg a , g b q, to rerandomize the ciphertext pc 1 , c 2 , c 3 q as following:
q Ð ReRandpp, pk e , pc 1 , c 2 , c 3 qq, where r 1 , s 1 P Z q are random parameters.
Given a circuit C p,sk,pk e , the detail of our obfuscator for the EBS Functionality Ob f EBS is as below:
1. Extracts pp, sk, pk, pk e q, where sk " g The output signature σ " pC 1 , C 2 q is blind to the Signer, as Signer couldn't recognize either pc 1 , v 1 q or pα, βq. But User can verify the signature σ by following verification algorithm Vpp, pk, m, σq:
Obviously, the obfuscation can be executed in polynomial time and has the same functionality compared with the original blind signature. So we omit the two proofs about functionality and polynomial slowdown.
The New Security Definition of the Blind Signature in the Context of EBS
We modify the above definitions to adapt to our proposals in the context of EBS. As we need to prove the security of blind signature in the presence of the obfuscator we proposed. In this section, we allow the Signer to access the obfuscation circuit as follows:
Definition 5. (Blindness w.r.t. EBS Obfuscator) An encrypted signature scheme EBS " pS KG, EKG, pS , Uq, Vq w.r.t obfuscator is called blind if for any efficient algorithm A 3 , all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u polypnq , there exists
pp, pk, pk e , C 1 , zq; b˚Ð A 3 pσ 0 , σ 1 q; b " b˚. Definition 6. (One-more Unforgeability w.r.t. EBS Obfuscator) An EBS scheme pS KG, EKG, pS , Uq, Vq is unforgetable if for any efficient algorithm A 4 (the malicious user), every polynomial pp¨q, all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u polypnq , there exists
p Ð S etupp1 n q; ppk, skq Ð S KGppq; ppk e , sk e q Ð EKGppq;
pp, pk, pk e , C 1 , zq; i f mi ‰ mj f or i ‰ j ; Vpp, pk, mi , σi q " Accept f or all i; then return 1. Definition 7. (ACVBP w.r.t Dependent Oracles) Let T pCq be a set of oracles dependent on the circuit C. A circuit obfuscator Obf for C satisfies the ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle set T if the following condition holds: There exists a PPT oracle machine S (simulator) such that, for every PPT oracle machine D (distinguisher), every polynomial pp¨q, all sufficiently large n P N, and every z P t0, 1u
where D !C,T pCq" means that D has sampling access to all oracles contained in T pCq in addition to C.
The Security of Special EBS Obfuscator
In this section, we attribute the the security of special EBS obfuscator to DL assumption and the random oracle model. Although our obfuscation can remove the random oracle in theory, there still have no effective methods to do so. The reason why we prove it in random oracle model is that the signature scheme we choose is secure in random model, which is a inherent property of the original signature scheme.
At first, we will prove the completeness property of our special EBS obfuscator. Informally, the signature is complete if for any message m, verification algorithm Vpp, pk, m, σq always set up, i.e., the probability: Pr Vpp,pk,m,σq " 1.
Lemma 1. The EBS obfuscation is complete.
Proof. Once the user receives the signature σ " pC 1 , C 2 q, he finishes the following proceeds in a polynomial reduction:
According to the verification algorithm, he has g
, he obtains the equation u
Then, the equation Hpm||ω 1 q " c 1 must be established. We outcome the completeness of EBS obfuscation. Theorem 2. Under DL assumption, for the EBS obfuscator and two messages m 0 , m 1 selected by the malicious Signer A 3 , the distributions of σ 0 and σ 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The blindness of EBS obfuscator follows directly from the hardness of DL assumption in the group G. More formally, we show that if an adversary A 3 can distinguish the signatures pσ 0 , σ 1 q of two message m 0 and m 1 under sk with non-negligible probability, then we construct an adversary A 1 that will break the DL assumption with advantage as well.
At first, we analyze the result of EBS obfuscator: we get σ " pC 1 , C 2 q " ppg a q 1 . Since C 1 and C 2 have the same form, we can only consider C 1 in the following work(C 2 also has the same result, we omit it here). Let p s " s`s 1 , p r " r`r 1 , so we have C 1 " pg p r , g p s , g p r`p s q. A 1 works as follows:
-A 1 receives as input a tuple pg, pa, bq, B " g p r , K " g p s , Wq where g is a random generator of the group G and r, s are random exponents. The goal of A 1 is to determine whether W " g p r`p s .
-A 1 picks a random generator g of group G. -On receiving two messages m 0 and m 1 from A 3 , A 1 flips a bit b randomly and sends the signature σ b :" ppg a q p r , pg b q p s , c b Wq as the signature of m b to A 3 . -A 3 replies with a bit b˚. A 1 simply outputs 1 if b " b˚(i.e., guessing that W " g p r`p s ); otherwise outputs a random bit(i.e., W is a random parameter).
It is easy to see that when W is random, the signature σ b is independent of b and hence the success probability of A 3 is exactly 1 2 in this case. When W " g p r`p s , the signature σ b has the same distribution as the result of EBS obfuscator. According to the assumption, the adversary A 3 has advantage at least . That is, A 1 succeeds in determining whether W " g p r`p s with non-negligible advantage, A 1 breaks the DL assumption.
Theorem 3.
[15] The blind signature is one-more unforgeable if discrete logarithm is hard.
Theorem 4. Let T pC p,sk,pk e q be S p,sk . If the EBS obfuscator satisfies ACVBP w.r.t dependent oracle set T , then the one-more unforgeability(OMU) w.r.t the EBS functionality implies the one-more unforgeability w.r.t EBS obfuscator.
